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Abstract—Bonus point systems are widely used for rewarding
customer loyalty in both traditional and electronic commerce
scenarios. Merchants aim to additionally increase revenue by
targeted advertising using customer data. At the same time,
customers wish to protect their privacy of what they purchase.
Common systems neither provide sufficient protection of pri-
vacy, nor protect the customers’ identities. Anonymity makes
it significantly harder to properly resolve claims of fraudulent
transactions, because identities are not recorded for any purpose
after a transaction has been committed. We propose an anony-
mous bonus system based on digital payment systems using blind
cryptographic signatures. We implement a protocol extension
that allows proof of bonus point possession in case of reported
misbehavior, and we identify the implications on security, privacy,
and performance of our proposals. Our results show that we can
resolve these cases of fraud within the system without losing
functionality in the bonus point protocol.
Index Terms—Blind Signature; Asymmetric Cryptography;
Digital Signature
I. INTRODUCTION
Customer loyalty programs are widely used by online and
offline merchants. These systems often use some sort of
quantifiable and discrete “currency”, e. g., bonus points or
miles. We term one unit of customer reward a “bonus point”
or “points” in the remainder of this article. Bonus points
are generated for purchases at the issuing merchant. After
collecting a certain number of points, customers can redeem
rewards and discounts or reach status levels with specific
perks. Some schemes allow direct payment at the bonus
network’s merchants using bonus points.
Bonus point system issuers like Payback [1] in Germany
provide a bonus system as a service to merchants with inter-
changeable bonus points in exchange for aggregated customer
data over the entirety of all participating merchants. Individual
profiles of customers generated through these systems are
often used as the foundation for in-depth market analysis and
targeted advertising. Due to the nature of these systems, there
is usually full transparency of the customer for the bonus point
issuer, i. e., the issuer can track the users’ complete purchase
histories. While privacy-preserving data mining approaches are
widely known [2], existing bonus point systems typically use
classic ways to conduct their analysis. From the accumulated
data, even more sensitive personal information may be derived,
e. g., if a customer is on a specific diet or if they are of
a specific sexual orientation [3]. There are also state-level
adversaries with potential access to the issuer’s database.
Potential customers may fear these means of data mining on
their sensitive personal data [4] and decide to not participate
in the bonus program, even if the system offers significant
rewards and advantages.
However, the actual primary goal for a modern customer
loyalty system is not the generation of highly personal profiles,
but an increase in revenue by incentivizing customers to
spend more money. This is usually achieved by shipping
targeted advertising (and possibly special offers with lower
prices) to customers. Targeted advertising contains offers that
match the customer’s needs deduced from their purchasing
history. In current systems, this is based on the detailed
knowledge of every customer. However, a customer loyalty
system where the system learns about the entire market (and
not about individuals) and detects trends affecting greater parts
of the population can indeed generate advertising offers for
selected subgroups of the participants without knowing their
individual purchase histories. By shipping these offers to the
relevant subgroups without actually knowing the receivers, it
becomes possible to create an entirely anonymous bonus point
system. With every receiver knowing their own purchasing
history, a customer’s device can be imagined to filter relevant
promotions and adverts from a broadcasted collection of
advertisement content.
Obviously, an important building block in such an archi-
tecture are the bonus points themselves. This is the aspect
we focus on in this paper: we show how an anonymous
bonus system can be constructed. To this end, we consider
the following scenario: Alice is customer at several different
merchants, including Bob’s and Charlie’s shops. Bob and
Charlie both participate in the bonus point system operated
by the system operator Debbie. Alice receives bonus points
from Debbie for every purchase she conducts at either of the
merchants. Bonus points are collected locally in a digital wallet
on Alice’s personal mobile device, e. g., on a smartphone.
After collecting some of these points, she can use them to pay
for a purchase at one of the participating stores. Of course,
double spending (i. e., Alice paying more than once using
the same points) is to be avoided, while at the same time
we want to achieve that Alice does not need to reveal her
identity towards any other party during the process. It should
also not be possible to trace bonus points, i. e., the transaction
or merchant where the used points have been generated should
not be revealed.
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David Chaum [5] in the context of e-cash. As we will show,
applying Chaum’s ideas already get us a long way towards
the above stated goals. However, there are also shortcomings,
and we will point out where naïve applications of the e-cash
payment protocol open up potentials for fraud. The usage
of an anonymous payment system depends on reliable and
instant fraud prevention, protecting both the merchants and
the customers. A key contribution of this paper is that we
show how these problems can be overcome.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II discusses related work from the areas of crypto-
graphic currencies and customer loyalty systems. Following
that, Section III leads to our proposal for such a system.
Fraud prevention techniques are presented in Section IV. An
evaluation for the proposed strategy is given in Section V
where we identify the impacts on privacy, security, and the
electronic cash protocol. Finally, Section VI summarizes this
paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we survey existing literature related to our
proposal. After introducing the state of the art in electronic
bonus point systems we discuss the applicability of existing
decentrally and centrally operated electronic payment systems
and show where our proposal differs from existing ideas.
A. Electronic Bonus Point Systems
Many customer loyalty systems use an electronic backend
that processes user data in order to generate market reports
and targeted advertising. Apart from places like small food
shops with paper-and-stamp-based loyalty cards, most of these
systems either use centralized, account-backed plastic cards
or mobile apps for their user management [6]. Payback [1],
the biggest customer loyalty program in Germany is used by
millions of people and identifies every customer over several
stores. Each purchase is tracked and targeted advertising, as
well as targeted offers, are distributed. While participation in
this program does not necessarily require a valid address and
the usage of one’s real identity, a combination with credit card
data or other tracking information impedes or even prevents
truly anonymous usage. In contrast to our proposed system,
Payback’s users are not anonymous and their purchases can
potentially be tracked in a central system.
Other approaches for a distributed bonus system [7] reward
customers for recommending merchants to other customers.
The authors propose a mobile system where bonus points
can be transferred from one person to another and redeemed
at any participating merchant. However, these systems are
not anonymous and users can be identified with their central
accounts.
Generally, we observe that bonus points can have many
properties of traditional cash. Bonus points are emitted by a set
of cooperating merchants that want to redeem their customers’
loyalty. They can be accumulated, (possibly) transferred to
other users, and finally used for buying goods and services at
participating merchants. Whether these goods and services are
restricted to a certain set of items or whether the bonus points
can be used as a real means of payment does not affect the
technical design of the bonus system.
Anonymous bonus points also have to be untraceable,
but also capable of preventing double spending. These two
features are also present in cash money. Therefore, a bonus
point system based on some form of electronic cash is a man-
ifest option. The following analysis of anonymous payment
systems is meant to provide an overview of potential ways to
implement such a bonus system. Non-anonymous electronic
payment systems like, e. g., those found in online games like
World of Warcraft [8], will not be discussed, as we aim
for a privacy-preserving bonus point system with anonymous
participants.
B. Decentralized Electronic Assets
Systems with central control are usually regulated by a state
because of the immediate liability of the central issuer in its
local legal framework. If a system requires to avoid central
issuers in favor of a completely distributed management of
assets, the ecosystem around the Bitcoin [9] protocol is a
promising alternative. In Bitcoin, all transactions are stored
in a distributed ledger, the so-called blockchain. This enables
the system to operate without any central issuer. The assets
in Bitcoin are mined by its users in a distributed proof-of-
work process. Bonus points, on the other hand, have to be
generated after each completed transaction of goods between
a merchant and a customer. Thus, a system where merchants
mine their own bonus points in a system similar to Bitcoin
would need thorough adjustments so that every merchant has
enough coins even in times of unusually high volume of
sales. Customers, too, often hold no real interest in providing
their mobile data connection to the Internet in order to
contribute to a blockchain for bonus points. Proof-of-work-
based systems have the additional disadvantage of requiring
computing resources that cannot be used for other purposes
while mining, making it infeasible for mobile devices of
customers. Another disadvantage, however, are more complex
regulations for merchants that plan to use Bitcoin or other
cryptocurrencies legally.
Ethereum [10] is a framework for smart contract that uses
its own blockchain. These contracts are publicly recorded and
executed by the users of this distributed system. They are in
fact turing-complete programs. A theoretical way to implement
a bonus program would be to build it as a smart contract
system on top of the Ethereum blockchain. However, a major
concern is the slow process of transaction clearing. Blockchain
transactions have to be in one of the “surviving” blocks in
case of a fork, thus participants have to wait up to an hour to
have relative certainty of a finished transaction. Customers of
bonus point system expect instant clearing and are generally
not interested in uncertain and slowly arriving bonus points.
C. Centrally Operated Electronic Cash Schemes
Traditional electronic cash systems rely on a central issuer.
That issuer performs a role comparable to central banks in
state-issued cash currencies. The concept of electronic cash
was originally introduced by David Chaum in [5], [11]. Chaum
proposes a system where units of digital currency, coins, are
stored decentrally by the users just like traditional coins and
notes. These coins are identified by serial numbers; they gain
their value by being digitally signed by the central issuer.
Consequently, a valid coin is embodied by the tuple of a
(user-selected) coin ID and the corresponding digital signature
issued by the issuer. This construction ensures that no coin
can be forged by a single user without breaking the issuer’s
private RSA [12] signing key. In order to guarantee anonymity,
the signatures are conducted blindly: the issuer does not learn
the coin ID which it signs. To this end, the user performs a
blinding operation on the coin ID and hands the blinded ID to
the central issuer. There it is signed and returned. Afterwards,
the user reverts the blinding operation on both the blinded ID
and the signature and thereby gains a valid digital signature
for the unblinded original ID. That ID is now only known
to the user and certified by the central issuer’s signature.
Other implementations of Chaum’s scheme use other public-
key systems, e. g., the discrete logarithm problem [13] or the
ElGamal system [14].
When paying with a coin in such a system, the user hands
over the coin ID and the signature to the receiver of the
payment. The receiver can check offline whether the signature
is correct (given he knows the public key of the central issuer).
An online check is required to prevent double spending: the
issuer is notified of the secret ID the user spends and this ID is
listed as “spent” by the central issuer. If a second transaction
using the same ID is attempted, the central issuer can tell the
receiver to not accept the already spent coin. The downside of
that approach is the requirement to have an online connection
to the central issuer’s system at the time of the payment.
Other mechanisms for preventing double spending are suit-
able in an offline scenario. The basic idea is to embed the
payer’s identity into the coins in such a way that at least
two distinct entities need to cooperate in order to reveal a
user’s identity [15]. These two entities have to possess certain
decryption information, which can only be obtained if the coin
has been spent at that entity. Identification of the fraudulent
payer can only be performed if two parties cooperate and both
have received the same coin from the payer. Thus, if an honest
user does not try to cheat and therefore does not spend coins
twice, unwanted identification is not possible. Such systems
do not need an immediate fraud detection technique, it is
sufficient to deanonymize the fraudulent party at a later point
and use legal means to punish them and go for compensation.
Their main advantage is the possibility to be used in scenarios
where the victim of the fraud is offline during the transaction
and comes online later, after the fraudulent customer has left.
All of these systems, however, rely on a central issuer to at
least perform the signatures.
To our knowledge, there exists no bonus point system using
electronic cash as a basis for operation. Its advantages of
guaranteed anonymity, central control, and user-friendliness
make it favorable for such a system.
III. ANONYMOUS BONUS POINTS
As discussed before, the anonymous bonus point system
is based on Chaum’s electronic cash [5]. We identify three
essential actors: many customers, like Alice, buy goods and
services at several merchants, two of which are Bob and
Charlie. These merchants, in turn, participate like Alice in a
customer loyalty system operated by the bonus point issuer
Debbie. In the literature about electronic cash [11], these
actors are often referred to the payers, payees, and the issuer,
respectively.
A. Bonus Point Generation
Figure 1 shows the life cycle of a bonus point. A simple,
first idea of how to use Chaum’s electronic cash for this use
case is sketched in the following.
Bonus points are created after Alice finishes a real-world
transaction paying for goods or services at Bob. The next step
is the generation of a bonus point. This operation is executed
between Alice and the bonus point issuer Debbie. Essentially,
the customer locally generates a random number C that is
used as the bonus point ID. This ID has to remain secret
until the bonus point is spent again. Afterwards, C is blinded
using a blinding function b() so that the original value of C is
concealed. In case of RSA [12], this function utilizes Debbie’s
public key (e,N) and another random secret number r [11]
b(C) := re · C mod N.
Other cryptosystems support similar constructions with differ-
ent forms of the blinding function, but providing the same
functionality [16].
This blind ID can be sent from Alice to Debbie. Debbie
signs the blinded bonus point ID using a signature algorithm
σ()—RSA in this example—using her private key (d,N)
σ(b(C)) := b(C)
d
mod N = (re · C)d mod N.
Note that d · e = 1 in RSA where e is the private modulus
from Alice’s private key.
The signature is then sent back to Alice who can apply the
unblinding function u()
u
(
σ(C),r
)
:= re·d · Cd · 1
r
= Cd = σ(C).
Thus, the bonus points are embossed with a unique ID C only
known to the customer Alice. ID collisions are theoretically
possible, therefore the ID space has to be big enough to make it
unlikely that two customers select the same random number.
With sufficiently long IDs (128 bit or more), collisions are
unlikely enough for practical applications [17].
Spending the bonus point begins by transmitting its ID C
and the corresponding signature σ(C) from the customer Alice
to the merchant Bob. The first step for Bob is to check if σ(C)
is indeed a valid signature for C. To prevent double spending,
he reports C to a central database hosted by the bonus point
issuer Debbie. Debbie checks if this bonus point ID is so far
unknown and returns the answer. The bonus point ID is stored
as spent in the database. As a final step of the transaction,
Bob relays that answer to the customer and thus finalizes
the transaction. A correctly identified bonus point cannot be
spent twice if the database is queried during the transaction
and correctly updated after its completion. This process so far
essentially follows the e-cash protocol as proposed by Chaum.
However, we make an important observation here: in the
usage scenario as outlined above, consider the step where
Alice hands over C and σ(C) to Bob. From this point on, Bob
has knowledge of C—but there is no imminent guarantee for
a cleared transaction for Alice. As we will see, this opens up
potentials for the merchant Bob to cheat on the customer Alice,
without Alice even being able to prove that this happened. We
will come back to this issue soon.
B. Merchant Vouchers
Before we take up the problem of the merchant being able to
cheat on the customer, we consider the case of a potentially
cheating customer Alice. If Alice is acting maliciously, she
might send blinded bonus point IDs to Debbie that are not
backed by any transaction at one of the merchants. Obviously,
we need a way for Debbie to check that the bonus point
creation is backed by a corresponding transaction at one of
the merchants. This will go hand in hand with Debbie billing
the merchants for the issued bonus points—and all that without
revealing Alice’s identity to any other entity.
We introduce what we call vouchers into the bonus point
generation process. Figure 2 shows the accordingly modified
bonus point protocol. During the checkout process, Alice
receives a voucher V for every unit of money spent. The
voucher contains a serial number that is unique and linked to
the merchant Bob. Vouchers are generated by or registered at
Debbie. They can be created either online during the payment
process or potentially also proactively in advance. If Alice is
to receive one bonus point, Bob will transfer a voucher to
Alice.
The voucher then serves as a form of payment for the blind
signature to ensure that an eligible transaction grounds the
issued blind signature. Consequently, when Alice asks Debbie
to sign a bonus point, she has to provide a valid (and yet un-
used) voucher in exchange. Moreover, Debbie can bill Bob
for the exact amount of bonus points originating at his store,
simply by billing Bob for the vouchers that are issued for him.
IV. FRAUD PREVENTION
Coming back to the problem pointed out above, a fraudulent
merchant can, however, still illicitly gain a benefit by cheating
on Alice. When Alice pays at Charlie’s with bonus points,
Charlie may instantly decline the transaction as invalid, while
still gaining knowledge of the secret bonus point ID including
the corresponding signature of Debbie. Alice will only receive
the response that the bonus point has not been accepted.
She cannot check (let alone prove) whether the information
received from the merchant is correct. That is, Alice cannot
check whether the bonus point is indeed not valid, i. e., has
previously been used for a payment already, or whether Charlie
is lying by claiming the, actually unused, point has been used.
Alice Bob Debbie
Payment
Goods
Checkout Transaction
C
Get random ID
C
b(C)
Bonus Point Blinding
b(C)
b(C)
σ(b(C)
Sign
σ(b(C))
Blind Signature
σ(b(C))
σ(C)
Signature Unblinding
Bonus Point Generation
σ(C)
C
Double Spend Check
Bonus Point Spending
Fig. 1: The life cycle of a bonus point.
Alice Bob Debbie
Payment
Request voucher
Voucher V
V
Checkout Transaction
C
Get random ID
C
b(C)
Bonus Point Blinding
b(C), V
V
Check voucher
b(C)
σ(b(C))
Sign
σ(b(C))
Blind Signature
Bonus Point Generation
Fig. 2: Bonus points with the extension of merchant vouchers.
Charlie, in turn, is able to take the role of a customer at
another merchant—say, Bob—and use the illegally obtained
bonus point to purchase goods himself. When Alice attempts
to spend her bonus point after the fraudulent merchant has
done so already, the transaction will (rightfully) be declined
as double spending. In this scenario, the bonus points are
effectively stolen without Alice being able to prove this.
The goal of any process handling this problem is to create
an atomic transaction that, if aborted, does not result in any
Alice
random_seed
Get random seed
random_seed
Csecret,Cpub
Point ID Key Generation
Cpub
b(Cpub)
Point Blinding
Bonus Point Generation
Fig. 3: Bonus point generation with asymmetric cryptographic
signatures.
useful knowledge gain at either side. A feasible approach, that
we will demonstrate in our proposed protocol, is to use the
principle of cryptographic knowledge proofs.
A. Proofs of Point Ownership
Asymmetric cryptographic keys can be used to implement
a proof system where customers prove their knowledge of
the bonus point secret to Debbie, the central database oper-
ator. Proving knowledge of the point secret can be used by
legitimate point owners to solve disputes where merchants
maliciously reject unspent points, thereafter claiming their
value themselves. To implement this fraud prevention, we
propose to change the point creation process to introduce the
point secret. More specifically, we replace the random bonus
point ID by an asymmetric key pair, for example from the
ElGamal cryptosystem [18] or the RSA cryptosystem [12]. The
bonus point ID consists of the public key component Cpub of
an asymmetric key pair, as displayed in Figure 3, while Alice
keeps the associated secret key Csecret. Alice generates this
key pair when she wants to generate a bonus point. The secret
key remains secret at all times and is held by the wallet on
Alice’s device at least until the spending transaction is cleared
by Debbie’s database.
When creating a bonus point, Alice no longer blinds and
transfers the actual secret ID Csecret to Debbie. Instead, the
ID subject to blinding is the public key Cpub. The key pair is
generated with sufficiently long keys so that an attacker keen
on guessing Csecret does not succeed in a reasonable amount
of time [19]. We propose to use at least 2048 bit for RSA
keys. By that, we also ensure that the probability of a random
collision is still low enough, even though not every number is
prime and thus can not be the private modulus of an RSA key
pair.
After unblinding, Alice holds a signature of the public key
Cpub, forming the bonus point ID σ(Cpub). When spending
a bonus point she can reveal the blindly provided signature
σ(Cpub) and the public key component Cpub of the secret.
The merchant Bob then proceeds with verifying the signature’s
validity and forwards the public key Cpub to the central issuer
Debbie.
Should Alice’s spending be rejected and she suspects fraud
committed by Bob, Alice files a claim at Debbie, as displayed
in Figure 4. In the next step Debbie authenticates herself and
sends a random challenge to Alice and asks her to sign it
using the private key Csecret associated with the signed public
key Cpub that was used in the disputed transaction. Alice is
supposed to append a random nonce to the challenge before
signing it in order to prevent a chosen plaintext attack [20].
Generally, a chosen plaintext attack is an attack where the
attacker forces the victim to sign or encrypt a specific message
in order to gain knowledge on the structure of the victim’s
private key. If Alice can provide a valid signature to the
challenge, it is safe to assume she is in fact in possession
of the secret key and has been cheated on by a merchant.
A particular benefit of our key-pair-based proof protocol is
that Alice never reveals her secret bonus point ID. In particular,
the secret is not even revealed when a fraud claim is filed.
Keeping the point ID secret makes our approach resistant
against attacks where the merchant Bob and the issuer Debbie
collude to extract Alice’s point secrets.
Albeit, detecting which merchant is the one cheating is still
an unsolved problem: Debbie relies on Alice’s report of where
she has unsuccessfully tried to spend the stolen bonus point.
After Alice’s proof of point ownership, Debbie can reim-
burse the customer. Any other participant in the system cannot
provide the signed response to the challenge without breaking
the underlying crypto-system. Additionally, customers still
cannot generate additional bonus point IDs, because valid
bonus points still carry Debbie’s signature.
B. Authorization Receipts
While the fraud resolution protocol we discussed in Sec-
tion IV-A is necessary to protect legitimate customers, it opens
up an additional attack vector that we address in the following.
Namely, a fraudulent customer might invoke the disputation
process, claiming that the merchant has tried to commit fraud
while, in fact, the customer tries to achieve double spending.
Alice Cheating Merchant Bob Debbie
σ(Cpub)
Error
σ(Cpub)
Cpub
Double Spend Check
Bonus Point Stealing
σ(Cpub), Fraud!
Challenge
Invalid signature
Challenge
σsecret(Challenge)
Resolved
Fraud Detection
Fig. 4: Fraud and its resolution in the asymmetric signature
case.
Alice Bob
(t, nB)
σ(C)
σsecret(t, nB , nA)
Bonus Point Spending
Fig. 5: Payment protocol with authorization receipts.
To illustrate the attack, consider a fraudulent customer
Evan, two honest merchants Bob and Charlie, and the central
issuer Debbie. Evan purchases a good at Bob’s store using an
already spent bonus point represented by the signed public key
component Cpub. Bob consequently fails to validate the bonus
point with Debbie and denies the transaction. After that, Evan
contacts Debbie via the fraud resolution system and claims he
has been cheated on by a third, uninvolved merchant Charlie.
Evan is able to provide the bonus point’s secret key component
to Debbie and, thereby, confirms ownership of the bonus point.
The information presented to Debbie looks exactly like in the
case of actual fraud against Evan by the unsuspecting merchant
Charlie. We call this the reverse customer fraud attack.
The reverse customer fraud attack relies on an uninformed
merchant that can be framed as an unlawful adversary trying
to withhold the transaction. To counter the attack, we add
an additional receipt to the point spending process, which
proves the customer’s intent to exchange points for goods. The
additional receipt can then be used by merchants to uncover
malicious users. Figure 5 shows the necessary changes in the
payment protocol.
In addition to receiving the actual bonus point, the merchant
poses a challenge with a random nonce, a current time stamp,
and the merchant ID. The customer adds an own nonce to the
tuple and signs all values using the bonus point’s secret key in
order to proceed. The merchant’s nonce and timestamp ensure
freshness and tie the receipt to the current transaction without
the customer having to verify individual transaction details.
The customer’s nonce prevents a chosen-plaintext attack [20]
mounted by the merchant. The merchant can verify the client’s
signature using the bonus point’s public key component. This
signed challenge is called an authorization receipt and can
be stored and later used by the merchant to prove that the
customer had knowledge of the secret key and the intent to
pay at the merchant’s shop. Note that with these receipts it
is no longer necessary for the issuer to rely on the customer
when identifying cheating merchants.
V. EVALUATION
To evaluate our protocol, we define privacy and security
requirements, and we demonstrate how our protocol fulfills
these requirements. First, we identify incentives and capabil-
ities for each group of participants in our system, focusing
on requirements for user privacy and system integrity. We
then discuss how each requirement is fulfilled by the proposed
algorithms.
A. System Participants
To define our adversary model, we identify several scenarios
where different parties can conduct fraud on other participants.
Each participant has different interests in the system, and we
assume that each might use their capabilities to gain an unfair
advantage.
• Customers may seek to gain bonus points without having
paid for goods in an eligible transaction. They also gain
an advantage if they can mount double spending attacks
using their bonus points. Additionally, customers might
try to abuse the fraud report infrastructure by trying to
frame innocent merchants.
• Merchants may try to decline handing out bonus points,
because the issuer bills them for every bonus point gen-
erated at a transaction from their store. Such misbehavior
can only be penalized directly by the issuer if customers
complain about that merchant. In addition, merchants
may try to decline valid bonus points to gain a financial
advantage. Further to that, merchants may themselves try
to redeem bonus points they obtained but denied from a
customer.
• The issuer has an interest that every party in the system
is forced to comply with the protocol’s rules. The bonus
point system is offered as a service to merchants, and if
either customers or merchants perceive that another party
easily gains an unfair advantage, they no longer have
an interest in participating. Maintaining trust between all
parties is thus the most important target of the issuer.
Consequently, a cheating issuer acts against its own
interests, because merchants and customers would no
longer employ the issuer as a service provider should
they detect such fraud.
We discuss our protocols properties in terms of customer
and merchant fraud and an attacker model for the issuer in
the following.
B. Customers
Customers are effectively not able to commit double spend-
ing, because merchants do not accept a bonus point if the
issuer’s database indicates prior usage of that point. Gaining
illicit bonus points without paying in an eligible transaction is
excluded by our newly introduced system of vouchers. Vouch-
ers ensure that for every blind signature there is a merchant
who accounts for its value. Counterfeiting a valid voucher
without possessing it from an eligible transaction is practically
impossible, as the serial number is very long. By choosing
a length of at least 128 bit a guessing attacker has to try an
infeasible amount of options before generating a valid voucher
by chance. The last remaining attack vector for customers
is the abuse of our fraud resolution system. The question
whether a customer intended to pay at the merchant can be
decided by using the proof of point ownership in conjunction
with authorization receipts, as discussed in Section IV. This
combination prevents customers from creating unbacked bonus
points and from gaining advantage by wrongly reporting
unsuspect merchants as fraudulent. Thus, customers are no
longer able to gain an unfair advantage.
A customer’s privacy is not threatened in any constellation
in our system. The underlying system of electronic cash
guarantees privacy when regarding all transactions present in
that protocol. At first glance, it may seem that the introduced
merchant vouchers reveal to the issuer the merchant that a
customer has conducted business with. However, if communi-
cation between customer and issuer is anonymous itself (e. g.,
by using a proxy server), the issuer does not learn anything
about the customer’s identity. The asymmetric-key-ID exten-
sion of the original protocol does not leak any more private
information than the random IDs from the original approach
if the assumption of hard reversibility of key generation [21]
holds. Like in the original protocol, the asymmetric key pair
for the bonus point has to be generated using a truly random
source and not contain identifying information like a MAC
address or other system-specific parameters. When the claim
resolution process is activated, information about the inner
structure of the private key still does not leak. In this case,
only the public key, which is itself derived from the secret
key, is leaked. Authorization receipts also do not convey any
usable information on the customer’s identity, as the signing
key is different for each bonus point and not linked to a certain
customer. The same effect can be observed in case of the
challenge-response protocol during fraud resolution. Thus, no
information is released that could endanger the user’s privacy.
C. Merchants
The main attack vector in the naïve protocol implementation
is for a merchant to steal a bonus point when a customer
tries to pay with that point. After gaining knowledge of the
secret bonus point ID, the merchant denies the fulfillment
transaction and uses the point itself. Our proposed extension
of asymmetric key pairs serves as a method to prove being
the original generator of a bonus point without revealing the
secret itself. With that, fraud remains impossible as long as the
secret key for a specific bonus point is not leaked, because of
the challenge posed by the central issuer that has to be freshly
signed by the suspected creator of the bonus point. However,
the merchant trying to commit said fraud can only be identified
if he tries to spend the gained bonus point in a later transaction.
Otherwise, a fraudulent merchant can only be identified using
complaint reports of customers to the system operator.
Combining asymmetric keys as IDs and authorization re-
ceipts leads to a system where neither merchants nor customers
are able to claim being cheated on due to the ability of the
other side to prove their intent and knowledge at the time of
the transaction.
D. Attacker Model for the Issuer
On one hand, the issuer occupies a central role in the
bonus point system and might seek opportunities to cheat on
customers and on merchants. On the other side, the issuer’s
business model is based on the successful operation of the
anonymous and trusted bonus point system. In contrast, one
might argue that merchants use the bonus point system as
secondary aid to increase revenue in their primary business
and thus might have the objective to unfairly maximize the
effectiveness of this tool. If a merchant is caught and subse-
quently excluded from the system, they might already have
gained more advantages than they would have by remaining
in the system for a longer term.
The issuer however performs its role exclusively in the
bonus system and gains income only if the system itself
performs well and without complaints by either customers or
merchants. Thus, the stakes of losing customers’ or merchants’
trust are high and substantiated reports of fraud have the pos-
sibility of killing the issuer’s entire business model instantly.
The customers’ main assets that have to be protected are their
privacy and the integrity of their earned points. In contrast,
the merchants’ goals are usually an uninterrupted operation
of the system and the prevention of fraud through customers
against them. Both parties put significant trust into the issuer
while constantly observing its operations in order to check if
the system still performs towards their goals.
Therefore, we assume an honest-but-curious attacker model
for the issuer because we are convinced that a malicious
issuer would not be operating for long. As established above,
merchants and customers can stop participating as soon as
they are convinced the operator is no longer acting according
to their interests. Using this model, we can exclude attacks
where the issuer issues bonus points without receiving a
valid voucher. The protocol requires that the vouchers are
always checked and every blindly signed bonus point can be
accounted for. On the other end of the protocol the issuer
could deny a valid deposit of a valid bonus point spent by
an honest customer at an honest merchant. Again, the chosen
model prevents this attack as the issuer is assumed to be acting
according to the protocol. Subsequently, the issuer can gain no
advantage in the system without damaging its own source of
revenue.
E. Performance Considerations
Next, we discuss the effects of our proposals when consid-
ering performance. For that, we term n the number of bonus
points in a transaction.
Our proposed bonus point payment protocol does not re-
move any of the original functionality found in Chaum’s
electronic cash system. Vouchers are used both for account-
ing purposes in the system and for preventing customers to
generate more bonus points than they are entitled to. They
bear unique serial numbers, but these are of fixed length
and can be managed centrally by the issuer. Therefore, only
a constant message overhead is necessary to transmit them
from merchants to customers when committing a bonus-
point-eligible transaction. The transmission of vouchers from
customers to the issuer during bonus point generation adds a
constant overhead to every blinded bonus point, too. A typical
voucher serial number is 16 bytes long, thus introducing 32
bytes of overall overhead when considering both transmissions
from the merchant to the customer and from the customer
to the issuer. The number of messages is either unaltered if
the vouchers are generated by the merchants themselves or
one message more per point than in the original approach if
merchants request them on the fly from the issuer. Thus, the
number of messages with or without vouchers is in O(n) with
message size O(1).
Point generation has no effects on the performance of
the protocol. While Chaum proposes to use a truly random
number, our proposal of applying a public key generation
function to produce the key pair with secret Csecret also
produces a seemingly random numerical public key Cpub. That
number is treated exactly the same way as the random bonus
point ID has been used in the original version of the protocol.
Thus, while message size is slightly increased (in case of RSA
we observed 2048 bit instead of 128 bit per message), it is still
a constant overhead per bonus point.
Spending a bonus point is slightly altered in our concepts.
The transmission of a bonus point from a customer to a
merchant contains an ID Cpub and its corresponding signature
σ(Cpub), equivalent to C and σ(C) in the first approach.
So, message size is still in O(1). When a bonus point ID
is entered into the issuer’s central database it does again not
matter if the reported ID is a public key derived from the
actual random ID or the ID itself. The issuer has to store these
numbers indefinitely in both cases and merchants can check
for their validity when accepting bonus point payments, so
that database is growing within O(n).
However, small differences can be noticed in case of au-
thorization receipts. At the time of transaction every bonus
point has to be accompanied by an authorization receipt, i. e.,
one more message exchange per point between merchant and
customer for generating the receipt. This leads to a number
of exchanged messages in O(n), i. e., a constant message
overhead per bonus point. When processing a transaction using
authorization receipts, every merchant has to store such a
receipt for any point involved, thus holding a database with
linear growth.
VI. CONCLUSION
In contrast to traditional bonus point systems, that generally
provide no privacy at all, we propose a completely decen-
tralized and anonymous scheme where users actually generate
bonus points themselves. This enables users to remain entirely
anonymous while participating in a customer loyalty program.
Additionally, we identified a weakness in the concept of the
electronic cash system, where a user could cheat. This is fixed
by altering the bonus point generation algorithm so that it is
possible to prove committed intent of transaction on one side
and identity of point generation on the other side. By that we
eliminate a specific fraud scenario and thus incentivize bonus
system operators to switch to such a system.
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